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Abstract 
We propose and empirically examine a comprehensive measure of institutional trading 
frictions to include the dimensions of price impact, quantity of execution, return 
dynamics, speed of execution or order splitting, and trading commissions. Our empirical 
analysis reveals that various hidden components of institutional trading frictions such as 
adverse selection and clean-up costs are persistent and could add significantly to 
previously measured directly observable components of transaction costs.  Our 
simultaneous system of equations accounts for the endogeniety in institutional order 
aggressiveness based on potentially superior information as well as order splitting 
strategies in the implementation stage to reduce transaction costs. Order aggressiveness, 
market conditions and other stock characteristics are associated with significant 
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Institutional Trading Frictions 
 
Abstract 
 
We propose and empirically examine a comprehensive measure of 
institutional trading frictions to include the dimensions of price impact, 
quantity of execution, return dynamics, speed of execution or order splitting, 
and trading commissions. Our empirical analysis reveals that various hidden 
components of institutional trading frictions such as adverse selection and 
clean-up costs are persistent and could add significantly to previously 
measured directly observable components of transaction costs.  Our 
simultaneous system of equations accounts for the endogeniety in 
institutional order aggressiveness based on potentially superior information 
as well as order splitting strategies in the implementation stage to reduce 
transaction costs. Order aggressiveness, market conditions and other stock 
characteristics are associated with significant variations in trading frictions.  
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 Introduction  
In his AFA presidential address, Stoll (2000) highlights the importance of trading 
frictions and presents various measures of observable retail trading costs. He distinguishes 
between real and informational components of friction and also between their static and dynamic 
measures. He concludes that work remains both in deepening our understanding of friction and 
broadening the scope of research. This is the task that we undertake in our paper by proposing 
and empirically examining a comprehensive measure of institutional trading frictions to include 
the dimensions of price impact, quantity of order and execution, return dynamics, speed or 
aggressiveness of execution, and trading commissions (acronym PQRST). The issues are even 
more important to understand in the institutional trading context because institutional players 
now hold 74% of all outstanding stocks according to Bogle (2008, page 35). 
We analyze the determinants of PQRST, its persistence, and its randomness. Whereas the 
vast majority of academic microstructure studies focus on directly observable average trading 
costs, Almgren and Chriss (2000) and Engle and Ferstenberg (2007) suggest in their theoretical 
models that it is equally important to understand the risk arising from randomness of transaction 
cost and frequent non-execution of orders. Only with all these tools in hand, institutions can 
smartly route their orders and optimize their trading strategies to improve alpha capture, reduce 
price slippage, and prevent orders from being gamed (See for example, Bacidore, Otero and 
Vasa (2010). Carrie (2008) attributes the rapid proliferation of dark pools of liquidity in 
alternative trading systems to the increasing importance of hidden trading costs and timing risk, 
higher costs of traditional block desk worked orders, potential information leaks, and backlog 
effects from slowdown in execution because of transaction costs. We provide a comprehensive 
empirical analysis of several of these issues in the context of institutional trading.  
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Consideration of both observable costs and hidden opportunity costs is a fundamental 
theoretical concept spanning many areas of financial decision making including the field of 
portfolio management. Recognizing the concept that reality in financial markets involves the cost 
of trading and the cost of not trading, Perold (1988) launched the pioneer work on institutional 
trading costs. He defines implementation shortfall as the difference between paper performance 
and actual performance of a portfolio manager or an investment strategy. The implementation 
shortfall of institutional trading has two basic types of components. The first component, 
observable execution cost, is widely studied as it relates to the transactions that institutions 
actually execute and arises from price impact (P), commission, and other transaction fees and 
taxes (T).1 Wagner and Edwards (1993) suggest that directly observable costs are only the tip of 
the iceberg. The second component, hidden opportunity cost, is only sparsely studied as it relates 
to opportunity loss on any transactions that institutions fail to execute as well as adverse 
selection risks of both executed and unexecuted transactions.  
Our paper advances an understanding of the quantity aspect of execution (Q), which is 
important because an order that a fund manager does not fulfill to his satisfaction may contain a 
gain that investors had to forgo by failing to achieve an ideal investment. The magnitude of the 
opportunity loss will depend on the direction and the magnitude of returns (R) in the stock. We 
show that the interaction between the quantity dimension and the return dimension generates 
                                                 
1 This component of institutional trading friction is widely studied.  For instance, Berkowitz, Logue and Noser 
(1988), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990), Keim and Madhavan (1996, 1997), Chan and Lakonishok 
(1993, 1995, 1997), Jones and Lipson (2001), Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2001), Chakravarty, Panchapagesan and 
Wood (2004) analyze the relationship between investment styles, trade motivations, exchange listing, soft dollar 
arrangements and price impact of trades within the U.S.  Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) provide 
international evidence on determinants of price impact in bull and bear markets in 37 countries. Goldstein, Irvine, 
Kandel, and Weiner (2009) examine the impact of commission costs on institutional trading patterns. 
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hidden adverse selection costs and hidden clean up costs.2 An increased probability of filling 
orders with adverse short term price movements or not filling orders with favorable short term 
price movements makes these hidden components of trading friction more acute. In Section I, we 
provide formal definitions and additional background information about the various components 
of institutional trading frictions and their potential determinants. 
Our order level data from Abel/Noser, described in Section II, allows us to form some 
immensely powerful research designs that are not possible with trade only datasets such as CRSP 
or TAQ. We are able to directly examine the speed and aggressiveness dimension (S) of 
execution quality. For portfolio managers lost time is lost performance in terms of their assets 
under management and cash drag. Furthermore, the speed of execution is especially important in 
the context of institutional trading because of the role that it plays in balancing the observed 
price impact and the hidden clean-up costs. Our simultaneous system of equations framework 
explicitly recognizes that speed or aggressiveness of execution is an endogenous institutional 
choice. While, informed institutions are expected to be more aggressive than others, they would 
trade-off the information advantage with the potentially higher price impact of aggressive trading 
strategies. We study order size, order splitting over time, order splitting across brokers, and order 
fill rates to investigate these issues. These are difficult questions to answer so we are very careful 
in conservatively reporting our empirical results. For example, although no academic researcher 
can read the minds of all institutional managers to know their dynamically evolving portfolio and 
                                                 
2 In our framework, adverse selection cost (cost recovery) is loss (gain) from filled orders while a clean-up cost is 
gain or loss resulting from the failure to fully execute an order.  
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trading decisions, our judicious use of client supplied information gets us as close to clear-cut 
measurement of hidden institutional trading frictions as is practically possible.3  
Our empirical results contribute to the literature in several ways. In section III, we focus 
on institutional aggressiveness in the order submission stage versus order splitting in the trade 
implementation stage. When institutions possess better than average information, as proxied by 
favorable long term future excess return, they submit larger orders, execute them more quickly, 
avoid using multiple brokers, and finish with higher order fill rates.  When institutions are 
trading under difficult conditions that can potentially cause greater frictions, they adopt 
conservative implementation strategies. Order splitting over time, order splitting across brokers, 
and lower order fill rates are common especially for large order sizes, adverse market conditions, 
small market capitalization stocks, volatile stocks, and Nasdaq stocks.   
Section IV focuses on friction. First, we show that hidden clean-up costs are persistent 
and comparable in magnitude to the directly observable price impact, which doubles the estimate 
of total costs in relation to previous studies. An additional hidden component of institutional 
friction is the adverse selection cost. Our analysis sheds light on the informativeness of 
institutional trades by establishing that the adverse selection cost component is negative. Thus, 
institutions in our sample are actually more informed than their counterparties and are able to 
recover part of their trading costs as a result of their informational advantage. 
The magnitude of total friction, defined as the sum of price impact, commissions, adverse 
selection cost or cost recovery, and clean-up costs, in our sample period is 67 basis points or 
nearly $30 billion, nearly a third of which is incurred in form of hidden clean-up costs net of cost 
recovery. Thus, institutional portfolio managers and academic readers of our paper can have a 
                                                 
3 Institutional clients report order volume through the Order Delivery System (ODS), which includes complete 
history of all orders and transactions of portfolio managers. We exclude orders from other clients for whom order 
volume is algorithmically generated or inferred by Abel/Noser. 
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more accurate idea of the total transaction costs shaved from the paper portfolio return of their 
investment strategies. For instance, one-way total execution costs of 67 basis points in our 
sample imply a round-trip cost of 134 basis points. It follows from a 106% annual turnover 
computed from the CRSP mutual fund dataset from 1999-2005 that the round-trip transaction 
costs eat into nearly 31% of the value weighted CRSP return of 4.60% in that particular period or 
any other similar low return environments.  
As our final major contribution, we characterize the determinants of friction and its 
various components. Strength of institutional information, order execution strategies, market 
conditions, and firm-characteristics stand out as the main types of explanatory variables. The two 
order splitting mechanisms discussed above have opposite effects on overall friction and its 
components. Longer duration or splitting orders over time reduces clean-up cost, price impact, 
and overall frictions. In contrast, splitting orders across multiple brokers increases clean-up cost, 
price impact, and overall frictions.  Our innovative finding about the impact of longer order 
execution duration on the price impact component is different from prior literature because we 
explicitly control for the joint effect of order complexity, duration, and number of brokers in two 
stage regressions.4 Furthermore, adverse market conditions such as buying (selling) stocks with 
positive (negative) recent return accelerate cost recovery from filled orders but such conditions 
are also associated with higher clean-up cost, price impact, and total friction. Overall friction is 
higher for small and volatile stocks and lower for S&P 500 index components. Consistent with 
Bessembinder (2003) and Chakravarty, Panchapagesan and Wood (2004), we find that Nasdaq 
stocks face a bigger price impact. Even though institutions have better cost recovery 
opportunities in Nasdaq stocks, the effect of price impact dominates and generates a higher 
                                                 
4 This resolves the puzzle in past literature that longer duration is so common despite being associated with higher 
costs, unconditionally. After conditioning on order volume, we find that longer duration actually helps lower costs. 
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overall friction for Nasdaq stocks. Section IV also contains robustness checks and characterizes 
the variance and persistence of friction components. 
Our findings have several practical and academic implications as outlined in the 
concluding Section V. Institutional investors can use our cost estimates as benchmarks to analyze 
their own implementation shortfall. The numbers can also provide guidance on whether or not it 
pays to be aggressive in completely filling large institutional orders. More importantly, the 
implementation policy can be customized to address the effect of order-dynamics, market 
conditions and firm-specific characteristics. From the academic perspective, these measures of 
transaction costs provide evidence of limits to arbitrage and also implore asset pricing models to 
include these transaction costs because they can lead to significant deviations from the ideal 
performance of a paper portfolio that we so often see in theoretical and empirical papers. 
 
I. Background on Observable and Hidden Frictions and their Determinants 
Our paper contributes to the literature by presenting a comprehensive empirical analysis 
of various dimensions of the institutional trading costs – observable price impact, hidden clean-
up cost, hidden adverse selection cost, and explicit commissions – while bearing in mind 
endogenous order size aggressiveness, order splitting over time, order splitting across brokers, 
and partial fill rates. 
The execution quantity dimension, which arises from the fact that only some orders are 
completely filled as desired whereas others are only partially filled, plays an important role in 
determining the overall friction and its various components.  Institutions, in an attempt to 
minimize the price impact cost of more aggressive strategies, may use a less aggressive strategy 
and thus willingly face a higher risk or uncertainty about the quantity of execution. Unfilled 
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volume must be filled later at a potentially worse price or could possibly result in completely lost 
returns from an otherwise good investment decision. We analyze the cost of unfilled volume by 
computing a clean-up cost for a hypothetical trade execution at a fixed interval after the order 
submission. 
The return dynamics are analogously applicable in the computation of adverse selection 
cost of filled volume. Adverse selection cost occurs if orders with potentially favorable returns 
fill at a slower pace whereas orders with potentially adverse returns fill rapidly. However, if an 
institution is better informed than its counterparts the opposite can happen, i.e., a cost recovery 
can result from the filled volume instead of a loss from adverse selection costs. If the portfolio 
decisions have positive short term alphas, filled volume will be associated with at least partial 
cost recovery. Another form of hidden cost is adverse selection cost. The fill rate and return 
movement interact to generate adverse selection or cost recovery as well, with two computational 
differences relative to clean-up cost computation. The first difference is that we use filled 
volume for cost recovery instead of unfilled volume which is used for clean-up cost 
computations. The second difference is in the direction of returns.  For example, a positive return 
is a favorable situation for a filled buy in cost recovery calculations but an unfavorable outcome 
for an unfilled buy in the clean-up cost computation. 
These hidden and other observable components of trading frictions can be summarized as 
follows: 
Friction={Clean-up cost + Adverse Selection cost + Price Impact}*Order direction +Commission 
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where Pt+x is the closing price x days after the last trade completing an institutional order 
and Pd-1 is the closing price on the day before the order arrival, we is the proportion of order 
shares that actually execute, (1- we) is the proportion of unfilled shares, WTP is the volume-
weighted trade price of the component trades, order direction is +1 for buys and -1 for sells, and 
Ct is volume-weighted commission per share.  
We present a simple numerical example to elaborate the computation of these costs. 
Suppose, a portfolio manager identifies an undervalued stock priced at $100 (Pd-1) at time 0 and 
submits a buy order for 10,000 shares at time d. Subsequently at time t, a transaction of 4,500 
shares (we) takes place at $100.90 (WTP) for which a commission (C) of $0.05 per share is paid. 
5 The stock price rises to $101.50 in the short term at time t+x and to $110 in the long run at time 
L. In this example, without the knowledge of order fill rates, what would a researcher observe? 
Based on the initial price of $100 a 10,000 share order would appear to have a CRSP return of 
1.50% or $15,000 with the price rising to $101.50 in the short term (t+x), which is the focus of 
our paper. However, the institutional trader does not capture this full CRSP return. An amount of 
$4,050 is lost in price impact costs because the large transaction size of 4,500 shares moves the 
trade price to $100.90 instead of $100. An amount of $225 is paid in commissions. If we close 
the books at t+x by buying the remaining unfilled quantity of 5,500 shares (1-we) at $101.50 
instead of $100, then the clean-up costs amount to $8,250. This leaves the institutional trader 
with a short term return of only $2,475. Assuming that institutions incur similar cost at the time 
of selling, the long term net return by time L after deducting round trip cost is $74,950, well 
short of the CRSP return of $100,000.   
                                                 
5 For expositional convenience, we assume that an institutional order consists of only one trade in this illustration. In 
our empirical analysis, an institutional order may consist of multiple trades. We sum up all transaction shares within 
an order to calculate total transaction shares (we) and use principle weighted transaction price (WTP). 
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The goal of our paper is to quantify such deviations from CRSP return caused by various 
explicit and hidden trading frictions in the institutional trading setting. Since the short term 
return is positive in this example, the adverse selection cost is negative. Had the price at t+x 
fallen to 99 instead of rising, then the filled quantity would represent an adverse selection cost of 
$4,500 but the clean-up costs would be negative. Since an order can only have either positive 
clean-up costs or positive adverse selection cost, it is useful to offset these amounts to arrive at 
the net hidden costs.  
Since market-wide returns can influence the measurement of costs, we compute market-
adjusted costs by deducting market index returns from raw costs. For example, for market-
adjusted clean-up costs are: 
 
 
                (2) 
 
 
where MId-1 is the level of CRSP value weighted index on the day before the order is 
submitted, MIt is the index on the day of the last trade of institutional order. The concept is 
analogously applicable to adverse selection cost and price impact cost but does not apply to 
commissions. As a robustness check, we also repeat our analysis using beta-adjusted abnormal 
returns from the market model as the benchmark return.6 The results are qualitatively similar. 
We now briefly discuss the potential determinants of institutional trading friction. For 
ease of exposition, we group the variables into three categories although some variables may 
represent more than one category. The three categories are order execution strategy, market 
condition, and firm characteristics. 
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A. Information versus Friction and Aggressiveness of Institutional Orders 
We examine the impact of information based trades on institutional trading frictions by 
classifying an order as informed order if it is associated with a favorable one year future return, 
i.e., positive (negative) market-adjusted return after a buy (sell). When institutions possess better 
than average time sensitive information, we expect them to submit larger orders and fill them 
more aggressively to maximize their payoff.  
However, when institutions try to execute a complex order that is several times the size of 
average daily volume, filling it completely is naturally challenging. Such voluminous trading 
activity is also likely to reveal information more quickly to the market and results in a greater 
amount of clean-up costs compared to smaller orders which can be camouflaged more easily. 
Aggressive trading with such large complex orders creates huge price impact costs. Thus 
institutions would rationally adopt conservative implementation and endogenously split the 
orders across brokers and over time.  
Bertsimas and Lo (1998) develop a theoretical model of institutional order splitting over 
time, aimed at trading cost reduction. Typically, an order splitting strategy reduces price impact 
by lowering trade size but also increases the clean-up costs that arise from unfavorable price 
movements during the longer order execution period. This trade-off calls for optimization of 
order size, order duration, and number of brokers used to execute the order. Our study also 
includes order splitting across brokers. In contrast to duration splitting, the use of multiple 
brokers saves time and increases fill rates simultaneously. However, the disadvantage of this 
approach is that the increased probability of information leakage, front running, or other 
manipulations can exacerbate the lost returns component.  
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Handa and Schwartz (1996) and Wald and Horrigan (2005) develop theoretical models of 
clean-up costs and bagging costs of trading with limit orders based on a joint distribution for the 
subsequent return and the order execution probability. Although they state that their model is 
applicable primarily to small orders, similar issues are present in the context of institutional 
trading as well. We account for these issues in a simultaneous system of equations to capture 
institutional strategy, implementation, and performance in the empirical results section. 
B. Liquidity, market condition and order direction affect fill rates and transaction costs 
We now discuss the role of market conditions in determining transaction costs. 
Institutions demand (supply) liquidity when trading on the same (opposite) side with other 
market participants. Thus, we categorize orders as those demanding (supplying) liquidity when 
institutions submit buy (sell) order when the stock price is rising (falling). This approach follows 
Wagner and Edwards (1993) who argue that the liquidity characteristic of an institutional order is 
one of the most important factors affecting the total transaction cost of the trade. Liquidity 
demanding orders pay a higher price impact and are indicative of an institution’s aggressiveness. 
Liquidity supplying orders can get a lower price impact and are also more likely to be filled in 
the institutional trading framework. Since institutions are more likely to demand liquidity and 
pay a higher price when they possess better than average information, the lost returns component 
of any clean-up cost is likely to be higher for the unfilled portion of such liquidity demanding 
orders. A liquidity supplying order indicates an institution’s patience and may be associated with 
only marginal clean-up costs, if any. Liquidity supplying orders also earn the spread and thus 
face very low or even negative price impact. However, the adverse selection risk for those orders 
is high and thus the cost-recovery for filled liquidity supplying orders will not be as good as for 
liquidity demanding orders. 
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Although the discussion above focuses on the asymmetric friction in terms of order 
direction and individual stock returns, the same logic can apply equally to market-wide returns. 
Thus, adverse selection costs of filled orders are expected to be lower or negative (i.e., cost 
recovery) whereas clean-up costs of non-filled volume are expected to be bigger for buys than 
for sells in bull markets. The opposite would happen in bear markets with costs being higher for 
sells than for buys. As for the explicit costs, Chiyachantana et al. (2004) show that market 
conditions create asymmetric price impacts with buys (sells) costing more in bull (bear) markets.  
Another important market condition variable is the listing exchange. NYSE and Nasdaq 
listed stocks have distinct microstructure conditions and trading mechanisms, which can affect 
the various dimensions of institutional trading frictions. A large body of empirical studies has 
compared the performance of different exchanges. Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder 
and Kaufman (1997a, 1997b) report higher trading costs on the Nasdaq, a dealer market, than on 
the NYSE, a hybrid market though the cross-market differential has decreased steadily over time 
due to changes in order handling rule and reduction in tick sizes (Bessembinder (2003)). 
Chakravarty, Panchapagesan and Wood (2004) confirm that institutional trading cost, measured 
by price impact cost, is higher on Nasdaq than on NYSE after decimalization.   
C. Friction varies with Firm Characteristics 
The problem of clean-up costs of unfilled orders is expected to be more severe for 
smaller firms due to lack of liquidity. On the other hand, smaller firms offer more research 
opportunities for finding good bargains, which can help informed institutions generate a cost 
recovery instead of facing adverse selection cost for the filled volume. Big firms are more 
heavily researched by the entire market leaving little room for information advantage for any 
particular institution.  
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Stock volatility generates mixed predictions. While higher volatility reduces the 
probability of the non-execution of limit orders according to Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001) and 
Ellul, Holden, Jain, and Jennings (2007), it also implies larger return losses for unexecuted 
orders. Wald and Horrigan (2005) show that the second effect dominates in the context of retail 
limit orders. If institutional trading philosophy resembles limit order strategy then higher 
volatility would be associated with larger clean-up costs on non-filled volume. Volatility may or 
may not directionally impact adverse selection cost or cost recovery from filled volume but it 
will enhance all components of transaction costs risk. 
The next three variables relate to the potential information asymmetries in a given stock. 
Idiosyncratic risk is one such variable that captures the information asymmetry between market 
participants. Dierkens (1991) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stultz (2007) suggest that 
idiosyncratic risk can serve as a good proxy for the level of information asymmetry. We expect 
the firms with higher idiosyncratic risk to increase both clean up costs as well as cost recovery 
opportunities for institutions. Wider analyst coverage has the opposite effect by making more 
information public and transparent. Similarly, if a stock is an S&P500 index constituent, its 
greater liquidity can help reduce frictions. 
 
II. Data Sources and Research Design 
 
We obtain institutional trading data from the Abel/Noser. The company offers goal-
oriented trading strategies and trading cost measurement to help their 776 domestic institutional 
clients improve their investment performance and help with legal compliance related to best 
execution. The dataset includes details about the institutional investment orders and related 
purchase and sale transactions during the 1999-2005 period. We conduct our analysis with both 
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the full sample of orders worth $15 trillion and a subset of approximately four million orders 
worth $4.59 trillion, for which 107 institutional clients provide complete history of actual order 
volume and transaction data through the Order Delivery System (ODS).7 We obtain qualitatively 
similar results with both datasets. Whereas the full sample is more representative of overall 
institutional trading, the subset relates more closely to the research questions that we ask. This is 
because in the latter specification, we eliminate the observations where order level information is 
merely aggregated or algorithmically generated by Abel/Noser and not directly provided by the 
client. Actual order size in the latter specification enables us to work with actual fill rates instead 
of estimated fill rates.8 The analysis of filled and unfilled volumes provides us with excellent 
inroads into the hidden ‘quantity dimension’ of execution quality.   
The data provide comprehensive information on institutional trading orders and actual 
transactions resulting from each order. The variables provided in the dataset include scrambled 
institutional client code, scrambled institutional manager or trader code, scrambled broker code, 
scrambled order identifier number, stock ticker symbol, order direction (buy or sell), quantity of 
shares desired, order placement date, transaction execution date, price at the time of order 
release, number of shares in the released order, transaction execution price, quantity of shares 
traded, and commissions charged. The data are provided to us after removal of the actual names 
of the managers involved to maintain client anonymity and privacy. To ensure the integrity of the 
data and filter out possible errors, we eliminate observations with missing prices or order 
quantities. In addition, following the approach of Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997), we exclude 
orders that took longer than 21 calendar days to complete.  
                                                 
7 Order volume can be accurately identified by checking whether the order identification field is populated. Most of 
the results reported in the paper are based on this subset of observations. The remaining observations without any 
order identification will still have order volume which is either aggregated or algorithmically generated by 
Abel/Noser. 
8 Fill rate is defined as actual transaction volume divided by the desired volume or submitted order size. 
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Our research design and the unique features of the dataset offer several advantages by 
tracking each institutional buy or sell order down to order placement and trade implementation. 
Through the analysis of quantity dimension of frictions, we show that there is a significant 
mismatch between actual portfolio performance and ideal performance that academic papers 
usually measure using price datasets, such as CRSP or TAQ, because a significant portion of 
institutional orders don’t result in an execution. More importantly, we conduct trading cost 
analysis using information of both institutional orders and actual transactions while a large body 
of market microstructure research examining the impact of transaction costs focuses exclusively 
on observed costs (e.g. spread or price impact).9 Although limit order book datasets such as 
NYSE OpenBook take us a step further than TAQ by making the submitted orders transparent, 
they do not completely resolve the situation. Institutions often use order splitting over time and 
across different venues and brokers, thus fragmenting the information contained in the limit 
order book. Datasets containing institutional trades such as those by Elkins/McSherry have been 
used sporadically by Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) but those studies do not compare 
order size with actual transaction size. Moreover, these datasets are proprietary in nature and 
limited access to such data have restricted the proliferation of empirical research leaving ample 
scope for further research like ours to enhance our understanding about institutional trading 
costs.  
We merge institutional trading data with CRSP to obtain stock specific information and a 
value-weighted market index.  This index help us to control for market-wide returns. For 
instance, if the market index rose significantly on a given day, then all purchases, whether 
institutional or retail, may have more positive price impact for purchases and perhaps negative 
                                                 
9 The widely used database, such as NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ), only provides information on actual execution 
of trades. Furthermore, the fact that we don’t need to infer trade direction makes our results more accurate compared 
to research designs that rely on trade only datasets.  
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price impact for sells. Therefore, we conduct the analysis of both the raw transaction costs and 
market-adjusted costs.  
As shown in Table I, our final sample contains about 4 million institutional orders in 
5,688 securities from 107 institutions with explicit order identification and client-supplied order 
volume. The aggregate share volume of these orders is 148 billion and the dollar volume is 4.59 
trillion dollars. Of these, 3.2 million orders with 44 billion shares worth $1.49 trillion are 
completely filled. However, the remaining 771,861 orders with 104 million submitted shares are 
partially filled. Orders that are partly filled represent much larger order size and aggregate order 
volume. However, within those partly filled orders, only 24 million shares representing 23% of 
submitted shares are filled and the remaining 80 million shares are unfilled. In aggregate, 46% of 
the total volume of shares submitted (and 48% of the dollar volume submitted) in the full sample 
is filled and the remaining 54% shares represent the non-filled volume. The total number of 
brokers used by the institutions in our final sample is 451. On average each order is split into 
2.26 trades. 
[Insert Table I about here] 
 
III. Information versus Friction and Aggressiveness of Institutional Orders  
The framework of our analysis captures the three stages of institutional trading – strategy, 
implementation, and performance. We conjecture that order size strategy is determined 
exogenously based on the strength of institutional portfolio research and information. In contrast, 
trade implementation strategies – degree of order splitting and fill rates – depends on trading cost 
considerations. Eventually the degree of aggressiveness at the implementation stage is 
determined endogenously to trade off the gains of trading based on information advantage 
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against an increase in trading costs associated with aggressiveness. We find that future returns 
are positively and statistically significantly correlated with order size. The following preliminary 
order size regression result with calendar year fixed effects and institutional client fixed effects 
verifies the first conjecture: 
Order size = 1,060,679 + 46,001 *Future return – 2.95 *Firm size + λ*Fixed Effects + Error  (3)     
                 (11,883)                     (0.06) 
where order size is the monetary amount of institutional order in dollars. Long term 
future excess returns  is calculated by first dividing the individual stock price appreciation or 
depreciation in one calendar year following the institutional trade by the stock price on the order 
submission date and then subtracting the analogous CRSP value weighted return for the 
corresponding period. Finally, to obtain signed future return, we multiply the excess return with 
order direction, which is positive one for buys and negative one for sells. Firm size is in millions 
of dollars. λ is the matrix of coefficients for 5 calendar year fixed effects and 106 institutional 
client fixed effects. Standard errors for the coefficient estimates are in parentheses. The 
regression is based on 3,976,387 observations and has an adjusted R-squared of 0.06%.  Long 
term future excess return is a proxy for the strength of institutional information. It’s coefficient 
of 46,001 has a standard error of 11,883 which implies a t-value of 3.87 and statistical 
significance at the 1% level. Thus, we infer that institutions appear to be submitting larger orders 
more aggressively when they possess better than average information about a stock’s long term 
future potential. 
Aggressive order submission does not automatically translate into aggressive trading 
because of the offsetting trade-off presented by higher friction. Order splitting over time or 
across brokers is the mechanism to convert the large orders into smaller trades to reduce the 
magnitude of friction, particularly its observable components. In this section, we characterize the 
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choice of order splitting for various types of orders. In the next section, duration and number of 
brokers are used as endogenously determined variables which in turn affect transaction costs in a 
simultaneous system of equations.  
Figure 1, Panel A plots order duration on the right vertical axis and order volume on the 
left vertical axis for firm and order specific categories on the horizontal axis. For the overall 
sample, the 25th percentile of order duration is 1 day, the mean is 1.19 days, the 90th percentile is 
1 day and the 99th percentile is 6 days. We truncate a miniscule amount of orders from the 
sample to contain orders completed within 21 days. So, the 99th percentile is still meaningful to 
analyze as an indicator of maximum duration. Panel B plots the corresponding information for 
number of brokers.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
First, we partition the sample into three groups (Informed, Neutral, Liquidity orders) 
based on terciles of long term future excess returns.  Informed orders account for slightly higher 
order volume than liquidity orders and are executed more aggressively with shorter average 
duration.  Market capitalization categories present an interesting fact about order duration. Small 
(large) stocks have the lowest (highest) aggregate volume of 7 million (73 million) shares but the 
highest (lowest) mean order duration of 1.40 days (1.11 days). This pattern arises easily once we 
account for low market-wide volume in small stocks. Thus, the appropriate yardstick for 
understanding order splitting is order complexity, which divides the order specific volume by the 
average daily market wide volume for a given stock in the last 5 days. Although there are an 
equal number of orders (1.33 million each) in easy, medium, and difficult categories, bulk of the 
volume comes from difficult orders. Easy orders have a maximum duration of 1 day but account 
for negligible volume. Difficult orders with 98% of the volume have mean duration of 1.55 days 
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and 99th percentile of 11 days in Panel A. Similarly, Panel B shows that easy orders are filled 
with a single broker but the 99th percentile of difficult orders use 3 brokers to fill the trades.  
Given the importance of order complexity, it is used as a key variable in the duration and broker 
regression in the next section.  
In the next partition, liquidity demanding orders represent both a higher volume and a 
higher mean duration of 1.25 days relative to liquidity supplying orders. NYSE stocks account 
for a higher proportion of institutional volume but Nasdaq stocks take longer to execute. For the 
partition based on stock volatility, high volatility stocks account for a larger proportion of order 
volume and also a longer order duration. Number of brokers is similar across liquidity demander, 
listing exchange, and volatility partitions.  
Next we set out to understand the distribution and determinants of order fill rates. In 
Table II, we capture the incremental effect of explanatory variables capturing order execution 
strategies, market conditions, and firm-specific characteristics on our dependent variables, 
namely, the fill probability and the fill rates in multivariate regression settings. We conduct the 
analysis using two approaches – Probit and OLS regressions. The probit regression is estimated 
to understand the fill probability while the OLS regression is estimated to understand the fill 
rates. In the Probit regression, we estimate the likelihood of an order being filled, following 
Wald and Horrigan (2005). The dependent variable is equal to one for completely filled orders 
and zero for orders that are not completely filled. The goal of the Probit regression is to identify 
any trading strategies or features that are associated with full versus partial execution. This 
method treats all partially filled orders as equivalent to each other whether the order is filled only 
20% or 95% even though the latter is not much different from a completely filled order. In the 
first OLS regression using the full sample of all institutional orders, the dependent variable is the 
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actual fill rate for each order, which is 100% for fully filled order and ranges from 0.01% to 
99.99% for party filled orders. In the second OLS regression, we examine the determinants of fill 
rates for the sub-sample of 771,861 partly filled orders only. This measure can help us 
understand the strategies that help institutions increase the fill rate of the orders, conditioned on 
the fact that they are using execution methods that do not result in a complete fill. 
Explanatory variables fall in the four broad categories of information, order execution 
strategy, market condition, and firm characteristics. The indicator variable for an informed order 
is assigned the numerical value of 1 if the one year future excess return associated with a buy 
(sell) order is positive (negative), and the value of 0 otherwise. Following Chiyachantana et al. 
(2004) we define order complexity as the number of shares in an order divided by the average 
daily trading volume in the given stock over the prior five trading days. Duration is defined as 
the number of days elapsed from the date of order submission to the date of the final trade for 
that order package. The next variable is the number of brokers that it took to execute the trades in 
an order. Following Wagner and Edwards (1993), if an order to buy (sell) is made when the 
stock return on the order date is positive (negative), we classify it as a liquidity demanding order. 
An order with the opposite return scenario is classified as a liquidity supplying order. Adverse 
market condition is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an order to buy (sell) is made 
in the calendar month when the CRSP value weighted index is positive (negative). Nasdaq listing 
is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the stock is listed on Nasdaq and 0 if it is on 
the NYSE. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm in dollars. 
Stock volatility is calculated as the percentage difference between the highest and the lowest 
trading price in the past 30 calendar days prior to institutional trading order. All regressions 
include 106 institution-specific and 5 calendar year-specific fixed effects variables. 
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The first column of Table II reports the estimated coefficients from Probit regression 
based on approximately 4 million institutional orders. This regression has a pseudo R-squared of 
28.03%.  The positive coefficient for informed orders implies that institutions aggressively try to 
fill orders when they have above average information. The probability of completely filling an 
order decreases with relative order size as measured by order complexity. The next two variables 
represent transaction execution methods related to order splitting over time or across brokers. 
The probability of filling the order decreases (increases) with the number of days (brokers) used 
to execute the order. Liquidity demanding order, adverse market condition and stock volatility all 
adversely affect the probability of filling an order while bigger firm size favorably affects the 
probability of filling an order. 
The second and third columns of Table II report the estimated coefficients from OLS fill 
rate regressions. The adjusted R-squared for the regressions are 26.11% and 8.95% for all orders 
and partially filled order regressions, respectively.  The direction and the significance of 
coefficients in the OLS regressions are identical to those in the Probit regression with the 
exception of the Nasdaq listing indicator variable, which now takes a statistically significant 
negative sign.  
 [Insert Table II about here] 
The overall conclusions from the analysis in this section are consistent with the notion 
that order implementation is a profit maximizing endogenous institutional choice where they 
balance their aggressive use of information and large order sizes in the order submission stage 
against conservative trading strategies of order splitting in the implementation stage to reduce 
their transaction costs. 
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IV. Composite transaction costs and their determinants 
The end result of various institutional strategies discussed above can be seen in eventual 
trading cost performance, which is the final step of our study. Here we present the magnitude of 
institutional trading friction, its components, its persistence, and its determinants.   
A. Summary statistics of transaction costs  
Table III provides market-adjusted estimates for overall friction and its various 
components.10 Filled orders do not have any clean-up costs by definition. Partially filled orders 
give rise to clean-up costs of 64 basis points. Average clean-up costs for all orders, including 
both fully and partly filled orders, are 43 basis points or $19.88 billion in our sample. Adverse 
selection costs from fully filled orders are -74 basis points. Negative costs imply that institutions 
in our sample are better informed than their counterparties. Thus, they are able to recover some 
of the costs through their informational advantage. Partly filled orders also do not have any 
positive adverse selection costs but the cost recovery from such orders is minimal. On average, 
cost recovery of 24 basis points implies that institutions are able to recoup $11 billion dollar of 
their costs through short term returns. Price impact costs significantly alter the gross returns on a 
stock from order arrival to final execution. For fully filled order, price impact is 97 basis points 
and for partly filled orders it is 16 basis points. Overall price impact in the full sample is 42 basis 
points or $19.48 billion. Finally, commissions are 5 basis points or $2.33 billion. The total all-in 
execution costs are 67 basis points summing up to $30.68 billion in our sample. All these are one 
way costs that are incurred when institutions are either buying or selling shares.  
[Insert Table III about here] 
Figure 2 shows the respective shares of various components of institutional trading 
friction. Price impact represents the biggest component and accounts for 63% of total costs. 
                                                 
10 Raw costs not adjusted for market returns are very similar to the market-adjusted results.    
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Gross clean-up costs at 43 basis points are actually higher than price impact but institutions are 
able to recover part of these hidden costs through the informational advantage on their filled 
orders. Thus, the net-clean up costs are 19 basis points which account for a significant 29% of 
total trading costs. Price impact and clean-up costs are several times larger than the explicit 
commission costs that account for only 8% of the total friction.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
B. Friction is related to order execution strategy, market condition, and firm characteristics  
In Table IV, we assess the magnitude of total transaction costs and its four components in 
a univariate setting. The first four columns present the average trade level cost of institutional 
activity with no fill rate adjustment. The fifth column shows the average fill rate. The last six 
columns show the effective costs at the order level after adjusting (weighting) trade level costs 
with the fill rates (or one minus fill rates, as applicable), as shown previously in equation 1. At 
the level of each individual order, the unadjusted trade level costs times the fill rate (or one 
minus fill rate) equal the order level weighted costs.11 The differences in unadjusted costs and 
weighted costs highlight the importance of carrying out the analysis using complete order 
information. The past literature is mostly based on unadjusted costs and assumes that all 
institutional orders are completely filled. The additional knowledge of simply the average fill 
rate is not sufficient to learn about the order level frictions due to the significant variations in the 
fill rates of individual orders. The most appropriate approach is to use the weighted costs. 
Weighted costs are reported throughout the paper and used for majority of our analysis as they 
provide the best available measure of institutional trading frictions at the order level. The costs 
                                                 
11 Because of differences and uniqueness in order volume, fill rates, and transaction volumes for each order, the 
reported summary statistics at the aggregate sample level presented in the table do not yield themselves to exact 
equality. The minor departure of aggregated statistics from the order level equation represents Jensen’s inequality. 
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for the overall sample discussed in last column of Table III are shown again in the first row of 
Table IV but there is significant cross-sectional variation in these costs. 
We analyze the determinants of variations in institutional trading frictions in three 
broadly defined groups: order execution strategy, market condition, and firm characteristics. The 
first partition within the order execution strategy group is based on terciles of the order 
complexity variable, which are used to divide the sample into three groups (Easy, Moderate, 
Difficult).  Order complexity appears to be a key driver of order fill rate as well as institutional 
frictions. Easy orders have the highest fill rate of 92% which is more than twice as much as the 
44% fill rate of difficult orders. Cost recovery is low while clean-up and price impact costs are 
highest for difficult orders. Weighted clean-up cost for difficult orders at 45 basis points is a 
striking 232 times the clean-up cost for easy orders, which have negligible clean-up costs. The 
total execution cost for difficult orders is three times larger than that of easy orders. In 
untabulated results, we calculate the dollar cost of overall friction. The difficult orders face the 
bulk of total costs accounting for over 99% of the total institutional trading frictions of $30.68 
billion in our sample.  
Our next two partitions represent order splitting strategies over time or across brokers. 
We divide the orders into two groups based on whether or not the orders were split over multiple 
days or using multiple brokers. With respect to fill rate, orders split over multiple days have a 
dramatically lower fill rate of 31% compared to that of 65% for single day executions. This 
difference is likely to reflect the more difficult nature of implementation of multi-day orders 
forcing the institutions to break up their orders. The execution of multi-day orders is associated 
with clean-up costs that are nearly six times that for single day orders. After accounting for cost 
recovery, single day orders end up with net negative costs. Thus, a multi-day execution ends up 
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with the bulk of the frictions.  Of course, if institutions had tried to execute those orders on a 
single day, perhaps they would have faced astronomical costs. So the appropriate interpretation 
of our result is that order splitting may help reduce transaction costs but yet it may not be 
sufficient for direct comparison to the easy single day executions. The other type of order 
splitting is across multiple brokers. Order fill rates of 86% for multiple broker orders is almost 
twice that of single broker executions.  Despite the higher percentage of total costs, multiple 
broker orders account for only one third of the dollar transaction costs because the vast majority 
of the orders are completed using a single broker. Given that the execution duration and number 
of brokers can be endogenously determined by the institutions, we later estimate a simultaneous 
system of equation where these two methods of order splitting are modeled as institutional 
choice variables.      
In our next partition, liquidity demanding orders emerge as a major source of clean-up 
costs even though the proportions of unfilled orders were fairly similar between liquidity 
demanding and liquidity supplying orders. Of course, the definition of order type for this 
partition can directly lead us to the observed result. Liquidity supplying orders, in fact, have a 
negative clean-up cost. The reason is fairly obvious. Liquidity supplying orders are defined as 
sell orders in up markets and buy orders in down markets. If such orders are not executed and the 
market continues its move in the same direction then there is no opportunity loss because one 
would be able to sell higher or buy lower at a later time. However, during market reversals, 
liquidity supplying orders would have higher clean-up costs than liquidity demanding orders. 
The overall transaction costs are negative for liquidity supplying trades. Thus, a contrarian 
trading strategy appears to earn net positive rents of $19 billion from the business of supplying 
liquidity. In contrast, liquidity demanders face $50 billion worth of trading frictions.  
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Consistent with prior NYSE versus Nasdaq comparative studies of retail spreads (e.g., 
Bessembinder (2003)), Nasdaq stocks face a larger price impact, but also offer institutions 
even greater cost recovery opportunities. Overall, higher clean-up cost and price impact cost lead 
to higher overall frictions for Nasdaq stocks.  
Next, we allocate stocks into three firm-size groups with an equal number of stocks based 
on their market capitalization terciles. Trading activity in terms of absolute number of orders and 
share volume of both filled and unfilled orders is highest for large market capitalization stocks. 
However, the proportion of filled orders is marginally higher for small stocks at 50% followed 
by large and medium capitalization stocks at slightly below 50%. Institutional traders in small 
stocks could be more informationally advantaged and may be trying to lower their unfilled rates, 
but the lack of available liquidity might balance their aggressiveness, effectively putting a cap on 
empirically observed fill rates. Total execution costs are 111 basis points for small stocks and 61 
basis points for large stocks. Small stocks also have the highest transaction cost risk as measured 
by its standard deviation. However, with the lion’s shares of filled and unfilled orders, large 
capitalization stocks account for the bulk of total dollar transaction costs at $22.33 billion. In the 
stock volatility partition, high volatility stocks have clean-up costs and total frictions nearly three 
times higher than that for low volatility stocks. More important, volatility increases transaction 
cost risk as seen in the standard deviation column. 
The last three variables relate to the potential information asymmetries in a given stock. 
Analyst coverage indicates the number of analysts following the firm and S&P index-stock is an 
indicator variable on whether stock is an S&P500 index component. Idiosyncratic volatility is 
estimated as follows. For each calendar month, excess daily returns of each individual stock are 
regressed on the daily Fama-French three factors: Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML. The monthly 
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idiosyncratic volatility of the stock is the product of the standard deviation of the regression 
residuals and the square root of the number of observations in the month. Wider analyst 
coverage, inclusion in S&P 500 index and lower idiosyncratic risk reduce the opportunities for 
institutions to profit from research and are thus associated with lower cost recovery 
opportunities. As expected, overall frictions are lower for index stocks and higher for stocks with 
greater idiosyncratic risks. 
 [Insert Table IV about here] 
C. Regression analysis with simultaneous system of equations 
In Table V, we present multivariate regression results based on a simultaneous system of 
equations. The first stage regression estimates in Panel A show how institutions split the 
execution of their orders over time or across brokers. Order execution duration decreases with 
the strength of institutional information at the 5% statistical significance level. Every 1% 
increase in future returns in the favorable direction is associated with a reduction in order 
duration of 0.21 days. Order duration increases with relative order size (order complexity) and 
during adverse market conditions (liquidity demanding). The intuition for this result is 
straightforward as difficult tasks are likely to take longer to complete. Duration is also higher for 
stocks with a Nasdaq listing, smaller firm size, or higher volatility. Aggressively executing 
orders with these characteristics could clearly cause potentially greater frictions. Overall, this 
regression reinforces the notion that splitting orders over time is an endogenous decision. 
Multiple broker engagement is another form of order aggressiveness available to 
institutions. A common characteristic of duration and multiple brokers is that they split order size 
to help reduce price impact. However, the two forms of splitting have some diagonally opposite 
implications as well. Multiple brokers can shrink order duration and also increase order fill rates 
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as seen previously. Order splitting across brokers is used more frequently or less frequently for 
some of the same reasons for which duration splitting was adopted above, but multiple brokers 
are avoided in situations when institutions possess better than average information. This strategy 
of limiting the number of brokers will be optimal if brokers’ actions in shopping around for 
counterparties reveal the institutions’ information about future returns to a larger number of 
market participants.  
Given the similarities and differences in the two forms of order splitting, we expect them 
to uniquely affect the different components of friction. The second stage regression reported in 
Panel B of Table V has overall friction and its various components as dependent variables in 
separate regressions. Explanatory variables include order splitting variables from the first stage, 
market conditions, and several stock specific characteristics. Order complexity continues to 
increase overall friction and its various components. Longer duration increases adverse selection 
cost, but helps reduce clean-up cost and price impact cost. Our duration result is insightful and it 
differs from prior research because we explicitly control for order complexity in the two stage 
regressions. The result is also consistent with the fact that a higher proportion of overall volume 
is executed over a multiple day horizon.  
The empirical results presented earlier show that multiple brokers help increase fill rates 
and yet most of the order volume is associated with the use of a single broker. The friction 
results easily help explain that dilemma. Multiple brokers are associated with significantly higher 
overall friction and higher friction components. Since the final friction is more important than 
the intermediate fill rate, institutions use multiple brokers for only a relatively small portion of 
the overall volume. 
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The negative coefficient for liquidity demanding strategy of buying (selling) stocks with 
positive (negative) recent return in the adverse selection regression is consistent with the notion 
that when institutions have an informational advantage then they trade more aggressively and 
demand liquidity and finish the trade with substantial cost recovery. Whereas filling such orders 
is rewarding for the institutions, the clean-up cost for missing the trades is also very high. 
Liquidity demanding orders also have a huge price impact, which eventually dominates and 
creates higher overall frictions for such aggressive orders compared to liquidity supplying orders.  
Consistent with prior NYSE versus Nasdaq comparative studies of retail spreads (e.g., 
Bessembinder (2003)), Nasdaq stocks face a larger price impact but also offer institutions 
greater cost recovery opportunities than NYSE stocks. From a cost-recovery or returns 
perspective, Nasdaq listing appears to be more beneficial. Since institutional players who now 
hold 74% of all outstanding stocks according to Bogle (2008, page 35), companies listing their 
stock could give a substantial weight to institutional perspective. Thus, they may not necessarily 
see a direct need to list on NYSE for better retail liquidity alone if important components of 
institutional frictions worsen with such a move. Eventually, higher clean-up costs lead to higher 
overall frictions for Nasdaq stocks. Thus, our final comparative net cost-benefit analysis of 
NYSE versus Nasdaq for institutional friction is the same as retail friction, with total transaction 
cost being higher on Nasdaq.  
As expected, overall friction is lower for large stocks and index stocks while it is higher 
for more volatile stocks. Wider analyst coverage brings information in public domain and 
eliminates cost recovery opportunities for any specific institution. This leads to a positive 
adverse selection cost and thus, higher overall costs. Price impact is lower because counterparties 
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are less worried about any particular institution’s informational advantage for very widely 
covered stocks, but hidden friction components still dominate to create higher overall costs.   
As hypothesized higher idiosyncratic risk leads to larger clean-up costs, price impact, and 
commissions. However, institutions are net beneficiaries of increased idiosyncratic risk because 
of increased level of cost recovery from information based trading in those stocks. The cost 
recovery dominates other components and leads to negative overall costs for stocks with greater 
idiosyncratic volatility. 
 [Insert Table VI about here] 
The regression analysis helps us identify situations that can result in higher institutional 
trading frictions. However, the focus thus far has been on average costs. In the next section, we 
present additional analysis focusing on the persistence of these costs as well as variance in the 
level of friction to understand transaction cost risk.    
D. Persistence of hidden costs and transaction costs risk  
In Figure 3, we conduct a robustness test of opportunity cost results by altering the 
measurement period. In addition to the 20 day period used so far for t+x in equation (1), we now 
consider periods of 1 to 60 days after the completion of the last transaction in an order package. 
For brevity, results are shown only for a few sub-samples based on complexity and firm size but 
the patterns are persistent in other categories as well. 
For the overall sample, clean-up cost begins at 55 basis points one day after transaction 
period. Thereafter, clean-up costs remain persistent and range bound between 29 and 55 basis 
points with an average of 39 basis points that compares well with the 20th day reported value of 
43 basis points used and presented throughout the paper.  We observe this persistence and even 
tighter ranges of clean-up costs within the order-complexity sub-categories of difficult and easy 
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orders over time. Similarly, large capitalization and small capitalization stocks have persistent 
differences throughout the 60 day robustness analysis period. Overall, the analysis demonstrates 
that opportunity costs are highly persistent across time and the differences across the various 
sub-samples are stable irrespective of the measurement period.              
 [Insert Figure 3 about here] 
The average hidden opportunity costs statistics provide good benchmarks for overall 
institutional performance in a repeated trading setting. However, any single order carries a risk 
because its transaction cost can be very different from the average. For the overall sample, we 
presented the standard deviation earlier in Table IV of 8.6 basis points and also concluded that 
the risk was higher for small and highly volatile stocks.  We now provide additional insight into 
the transaction cost risk issue by separately examining the hidden components of friction in 
Figure 4. Clean-up cost charts are to the left and cost recovery charts are to the right. In each 
Panel, the horizontal axis captures the transaction cost variation by forming cost range categories 
with one percent intervals. We consolidate the extreme categories by clubbing together the 
orders that have less than -20% or more than 20% cost. The vertical axis plots the proportion of 
all orders with a given characteristic (e.g. large market capitalization) that fall in the transaction 
cost range on x-axis. For example, in Panel A which is based on firm size, 15% of all large stock 
orders have clean-up costs ranging between 0% and 1%. In contrast, only 7% of all small stock 
orders have such low opportunity costs. Less than 1% of large stock orders have clean-up costs 
exceeding 20% whereas more than 4% of small stock orders have those exorbitant costs. Patterns 
are similar for adverse selection cost (or cost recovery). Thus, the narrower bell shaped curve for 
large stocks and a flatter curve for small stocks indicate that small stocks carry a more severe 
transaction cost risk. 
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In Panel B, we focus on the variance in hidden opportunity costs conditional on liquidity 
provision. Liquidity supplier and liquidity demander orders have similar variance. However, we 
can see that the costs are slightly asymmetric. The liquidity supplier curve tilts to the left 
demonstrating that a higher proportion of liquidity supplier orders lower clean-up costs. But the 
same liquidity supplier category is skewed to the right for adverse selection costs. From both 
graphs, we can infer that liquidity demanders are more informed than liquidity suppliers.  
Finally, we analyze the implications of order splitting over time. Previously we 
established in Table IV that multiple day orders have higher clean-up costs and lower cost 
recovery. Now we show in Panel C of figure 4 that long duration orders also have higher clean-
up cost risks and lower cost recovery variance.  
 
V. Conclusions 
Institutional money managers such as mutual funds typically transact large volumes of 
shares to implement their portfolio investment strategies. The nature of their activity often results 
in large transaction costs that can undermine their performance by creating significant 
implementation shortfall. The observable and explicit components of implementation shortfall 
are fairly well understood. They relate to the portion of orders that actually executes and arise 
from bid-ask spread, price impact, commission, and other transaction fees and taxes. We analyze 
additional hidden components of institutional friction, namely, adverse selection costs of filled 
order volume and clean-up costs of unfilled order volume and find that the hidden opportunity 
cost of inaction is very high for institutional orders. The clean-up cost of 43 basis points is the 
biggest component of institutional frictions followed closely by price impact, both of which 
dwarf the explicit commissions of 5 basis points. Overall frictions in the full sample are 67 basis 
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points with a standard deviation of 8.6 basis points. To analyze the determinants of institutional 
friction and its components, we estimate a simultaneous system of equations to account for 
endogenous order duration and number of brokers and the effects of such order splitting on 
frictions.   
When institutions possess better than average information, as proxied by favorable long 
term future excess return, they submit larger orders, execute them more quickly, avoid using 
multiple brokers, and finish with higher order fill rates.  When institutions are trading under 
difficult conditions that cause greater frictions, they adopt conservative trade implementation 
strategies. Order splitting over time, order splitting across brokers, and lower fill rates are 
common especially for large order sizes, adverse market conditions, small market capitalization 
stocks, volatile stocks, and Nasdaq stocks.   
In our analysis of friction, we show that hidden clean-up costs of unfilled volume are 
persistent and comparable in magnitude to the directly observable price impact, which doubles 
the estimate of total costs in relation to previous studies. The adverse selection cost component 
of filled volume is negative. This leads us to infer that institutions in our sample are actually 
more informed than their counterparties and are able to recover part of their trading costs as a 
result of their informational advantage. 
Institutional trading friction varies with order execution strategies, market conditions, and 
firm characteristics. Friction and its major components are higher for complex, high volume 
orders, but spreading the execution of such orders over multiple days can help mitigate costs. 
Institutional decisions to split orders over time must be based on careful consideration of the 
trade-off between various components of trading costs, some of which increase while others 
decrease with duration. Order splitting across brokers significantly increases overall friction and 
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its various components, which explains why a large proportion of overall institutional volume is 
executed with a single broker, despite higher fill rates with multiple brokers.  Cost recovery 
opportunities are larger with liquidity demanding strategies in small, volatile, idiosyncratic, S&P 
500 constituent, or Nasdaq stocks. Clean-up cost increases with liquidity demanding strategy, for 
Nasdaq stocks, and stocks with higher idiosyncratic risk. The total friction increases with order 
complexity, multiple brokers, liquidity demanding trading strategy, volatility, wider analyst 
coverage, or Nasdaq listing and it decreases with and use of longer duration, firm size, 
idiosyncratic risk, and inclusion in S&P 500 index. Often the reduced friction is a result of cost 
recovery possibly through institutional informational advantage.  
The results have several practical and academic implications. Institutional investors can 
use our cost estimates as benchmarks to analyze their own implementation shortfall. The 
numbers can also provide guidance of whether or not it pays to be aggressive in completely 
filling a large institutional order. More importantly, the implementation policy can be customized 
to address the affect of market conditions, firm-specific characteristics, and order-dynamics. 
Although we focus on institutional trading in equities, future studies can examine if the results 
can be generalized to other trading situations and asset classes. From the academic perspective, 
the concept of total transaction cost should include not only the explicitly observed spreads, price 
impact and commissions but also the hidden opportunity costs such as adverse selection and 
clean-up costs. These expanded measures of total transaction costs provide the limits to arbitrage 
and also highlight the importance of asset pricing models that explicitly include transaction costs 
because such costs can lead to significant deviations from the ideal performance of a paper 
portfolio that we so often see in theoretical and empirical papers. With institutional investors 
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playing a bigger and bigger role in our investment portfolios, optimization of institutional trading 
frictions can have a direct and meaningful impact on our investment return performance. 
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Table I. Sample Description of Institutional Orders and Trades 
 
This table reports sample characteristics of institutional trading data compiled 
by Abel/Noser for 1999-2005. We eliminate the observations where order level 
information is merely aggregated or algorithmically generated by Abel/Noser 
and not directly provided by the client. We provide statistics for all orders, both 
fully filled orders and partially filled orders. Fill rate is defined as actual 
transaction volume divided by the submitted order size of customer-supplied 
order volume. 
 
Sample Characteristics:  
Number of institutions 107
Number of securities          5,688 
Average Market Cap (billion $) 3.59
Number of brokers 451
Number of transaction per order 2.26
 
All Orders:  
Number of orders with client-supplied volume statistics 3,976,387
Order share volume (Billion shares) 147.99
Total Order amount (Trillion $) 4.59
Overall percentage of volume filled (traded) 45.69%
Overall percentage of dollar amount filled (traded) 48.17%
   
Fully Filled Orders:  
Number of orders completely filled 3,204,526
Order share volume (Billion shares) 43.88
Total Order amount (Trillion $) 1.49
Fill rate (based on share volume) 100%
   
Partly Filled Orders:  
Number of orders partly unfilled 771,861
Order share volume (Billion shares) 104.11
Total Order amount (Trillion $) 3.09
Number of shares traded (Billion) 23.74
Traded amount (Trillion $) 0.72
Fill rate within partly filled orders 23%
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Table II. Probit and OLS Regressions: Determinants of Order Completion 
 
In the first column, we present estimates of Probit regressions with the full sample where the 
dependent variable is equal to one for completely filled orders and zero for incomplete orders. In 
the second column, we present the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression where the 
dependent variable is the actual fill rate of an order ranging from 0.01% to 100%. Fill rate is 
defined as shares traded divided by shares submitted. In the last column a similar OLS regression 
is estimated within the sub-sample of partially filled orders only. Explanatory variables include an 
indicator variable for informed order which takes a value of 1 if the one year future excess return 
associated with a buy (sell) order is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise. Following Chiyachantana 
et al. (2004) we define order complexity as the number of shares in an order divided by the average 
daily trading volume in the given stock over the prior five trading days. Duration is the number of 
days elapsed from the date of the order submission to the date of the final trade for that order 
package. The next variable is the number of brokers that it took to execute all of the trades in an 
order. Following Wagner and Edwards (1993), if an order to buy (sell) is made when the stock 
return on the order date is positive (negative), we classify it as a liquidity demanding order. An 
order with the opposite return scenario is classified as a liquidity supplying order. Adverse market 
condition is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if  an order to buy (sell) is made in the 
calendar month when CRSP value weighted index is positive (negative). Nasdaq listing is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the stock is listed on Nasdaq and 0 if it is on the 
NYSE. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm in dollars. Stock 
volatility is calculated as the percentage difference between the highest and the lowest trading price 
in the past 30 calendar days prior to institutional trading order. The Probit and OLS regressions 
include institution-specific and calendar year-specific fixed effects variables. Statistical 
significance is indicated by ** for the one percent level. 
       
 
Probit 
Regression  OLS Regression 
Order Characteristics 
Probability of 
Fully Filling a 
Order 
 
All Orders 
Partly Filled 
Orders  
      
Intercept 2.580 **  0.958 ** 0.130  
Informed Order 1.880 **  0.412 ** 0.466 ** 
Order Complexity -1.400 **  -0.820 ** -0.271 ** 
Duration (days) -0.408 **  -0.078 ** -0.033 ** 
Number of Brokers 0.479 **  0.038 ** 0.041 ** 
Liquidity Demanding Order -0.061 **  -0.011 ** -0.013 ** 
Adverse Market Condition -0.012 **  -0.003 ** -0.008 ** 
Nasdaq Listing 0.002   -0.004 ** -0.015 ** 
Firm Size 0.094 **  0.034 ** 0.070 ** 
Stock Volatility -0.210 **  -0.038 ** -0.033 ** 
      
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes   Yes  Yes  
Institution Fixed Effects Included Yes   Yes  Yes  
      
Number of Observations  3,976,387   3,976,387  771,861  
Pseudo R-square 28.03%      
Adjusted R-square    26.11% 8.95% 
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Table III. Institutional Transaction Cost and Its Components 
 
Total transaction costs of implementing institutional portfolio orders comprise of: 
 
Friction={Clean-up cost  + Adverse selection cost  + Price impact}* Order direction   +    Commission 
                                             OR Cost Recovery  
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where Pt+x is the closing price 20 days after the last trade completing an institutional order and Pd-1 is the closing 
price on the day before the order submission. we is the proportion of order shares that actually execute, (1- we) is 
the proportion of unfilled shares, WTP is the volume-weighted trade price of the component trades, order 
direction is +1 for buys and -1 for sells, and Ct is volume-weighted commissions per share.  
 
Market-adjusted costs are computed by deducting the market index return from the raw return. For example, for 
market-adjusted clean-up costs are: 
 
 
 
 
 
where MId-1 is the level of that index on the day before the order is submitted, MIt is the index on the day of the 
last trade of an institutional order. The concept is analogously applicable to adverse selection cost and price 
impact cost but does not apply to commissions. 
 
Dollar trading costs are obtained by multiplying each component of trading cost to the dollar value of 
institutional order. 
 
Trading Cost Components 
Market-Adjusted Institutional Trading Cost (%) 
Fully Filled 
Orders 
Partially 
Filled 
Orders 
All Orders 
Institutional 
Trading Cost 
(Billion $) 
          
Clean-up Cost  0.00 0.64 0.43 $19.88 
Adverse Selection Cost (Cost Recovery) -0.74 -0.01 -0.24 -$11.01 
Clean-up Cost Net of Cost Recovery -0.74 0.63 0.19 $8.87 
     
Price Impact Cost 0.97 0.16 0.42 $19.48 
Commission Cost 0.09 0.03 0.05 $2.33 
     
Total Execution Cost 0.33 0.83 0.67 $30.68 
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Table IV. Variations in Transaction Costs based on Order Characteristics and Implementation 
 
Market-adjusted institutional transaction costs are presented in percent. Partitioning factors for samples are the same as defined previously in Tables I and II. We use medians or 
tercile values as cut-off points to create the sub-samples within order complexity, firm size, stock volatility, analyst coverage, and idiosyncratic risk categories. The first four 
columns present the trade-weighted (or unfilled-volume-weighted) average component costs based on individual trades. The fifth column shows the average fill rate. The next four 
columns show the effective costs at the order level after adjusting (weighting) them with the fill rates (or one minus fill rates as applicable) as shown previously in equation 1. 
Total execution costs are the sum of adverse selection, clean-up, price impact and commissions. The last column is the standard deviation of costs across orders within the relevant 
category. 
 
Order Characteristics 
Adverse 
Selection 
Cost 
(Cost 
Recovery) 
Clean-
up cost 
of non-
filled 
volume 
Price 
impact 
of filled 
volume  
Commission 
on filled 
volume 
Fill 
rate  
Weighted 
Adverse 
Selection 
Cost 
(Cost 
Recovery) 
Weighted 
Clean-up 
cost of 
non-
filled 
volume 
Weighted 
price 
impact   
Weighted 
commission 
Total 
Execution 
Cost 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Total 
Execution 
Costs 
All Orders   -0.49 0.86 0.85 0.11 46% -0.24 0.43 0.42 0.05 0.669 0.086 
Complexity of 
Order 
Easy -0.53 0.02 0.02 0.06 92% -0.49 0.00 0.02 0.06 -0.410 0.078 
Moderate -0.43 0.14 0.04 0.07 80% -0.35 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.233 0.087 
Difficult -0.50 0.87 0.91 0.11 44% -0.23 0.45 0.44 0.05 0.709 0.093 
Duration of 
Execution (Days) 
Single -0.63 0.37 0.20 0.10 65% -0.41 0.12 0.14 0.06 -0.074 0.085 
Multiple -0.28 1.08 1.88 0.11 31% -0.10 0.70 0.66 0.04 1.297 0.097 
Order Splitting 
across brokers 
Single -0.49 0.88 0.73 0.11 42% -0.22 0.48 0.34 0.05 0.640 0.086 
Multiple -0.50 -0.21 1.53 0.10 86% -0.43 -0.03 1.35 0.09 0.975 0.099 
Liquidity Supplier -0.17 -1.11 -0.93 0.10 48% -0.08 -0.56 -0.47 0.05 -1.054 0.085 
Demander -0.73 2.10 2.14 0.11 44% -0.35 1.10 1.02 0.05 1.825 0.087 
Exchange Listing NYSE -0.13 0.78 0.53 0.11 43% -0.06 0.42 0.24 0.05 0.66 0.07 
Nasdaq -0.99 1.11 1.20 0.11 45% -0.49 0.56 0.61 0.05 0.73 0.11 
Market 
Capitalization 
Small -1.02 2.28 0.81 0.22 50% -0.53 1.06 0.47 0.11 1.108 0.114 
Medium -0.55 1.30 0.82 0.14 43% -0.26 0.67 0.41 0.06 0.888 0.095 
Large -0.46 0.71 0.86 0.09 46% -0.22 0.36 0.43 0.05 0.606 0.076 
Stock Volatility High -0.81 1.22 1.40 0.12 46% -0.44 0.56 0.76 0.06 0.948 0.113 
Medium  -0.39 0.88 0.57 0.10 45% -0.18 0.47 0.27 0.05 0.614 0.077 
Low -0.06 0.37 0.23 0.09 45% -0.03 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.321 0.061 
Analyst Coverage High  -0.28 0.91 0.72 0.10 47% -0.13 0.48 0.34 0.05 0.74 0.08 
Low -0.44 0.75 0.64 0.13 44% -0.20 0.40 0.30 0.06 0.55 0.09 
S&P Index Stocks Yes -0.18 0.83 0.60 0.10 48% -0.08 0.45 0.28 0.04 0.70 0.07 
No -0.65 0.90 0.88 0.13 44% -0.31 0.46 0.43 0.06 0.64 0.10 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
High -0.53 1.19 1.02 0.12 46% -0.25 0.62 0.50 0.06 0.93 0.11 
Low -0.07 0.43 0.23 0.09 44% -0.03 0.24 0.10 0.04 0.35 0.06 
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Table V. Regression Analysis: Determinants of Institutional Trading Friction 
The following system of equations is estimated with duration and number of brokers as endogenous variables in the first stage regression 
and various firm (i) and order (t) characteristics as instruments: 
Durationt = α0 + α1 complexityit + α2 liquidity-demanderit + α3 mcapi + α4 volatilityi +α5 Informedi + νt            
Brokert = α0 + α1 complexityit + α2 liquidity-demanderit + α3 volatilityi + α4 Informedi +α5 Nasdaq-listedi + νt           
frictiont = β0 + β1 complexityit + β2 durationt +  β3 brokerst + β4 liquidity-demanderit  + β5 mcapi + β6 volatilityi + β7 idiosyncrastic risk + 
β8 analyst coveragei + β9 index-stocki + β10 Nasdaq-listedi + εt      
 
where durationt of an order is the actual number of transaction days in the common first stage regression and the predicted value of 
duration from those regression estimates is used as an explanatory variable in the second stage regressions; brokert is the number of 
brokers used to execute an order, frictiont represents adverse selection (cost recovery), clean-up, price-impact, commission, or total 
friction on order t in 5 separate second stage regressions. Explanatory variables and instruments include complexityit calculated as the 
ratio of order shares relative to average daily trading volume over the prior five trading days;  liquidity-demanderit takes a value of 1 if an 
order to buy (sell) is made when the stock  return on the order date is positive (negative); mcapi which is the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization of firm i in dollars; volatilityit is calculated as the percentage difference between the highest and the lowest trading 
price in the past 30 calendar days prior to institutional trading order; informedit takes value of 1 if the one year excess returns of buy 
(sell) order is positive (negative). index-stocki is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the stock is an S&P500 index component; 
brokerst is the number of brokers engaged in the trades pertaining to the particular order; Nasdaq-listingi takes a value of 1 if the stock is 
listed on Nasdaq and 0 if it is on the NYSE; Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as follows. For each calendar month, excess daily returns 
of each individual stock are regressed on the daily Fama-French three factors: Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML. The monthly idiosyncratic 
volatility of the stock is the product of the standard deviation of the regression residuals and the square root of the number of 
observations in the month. analyst coveragei indicates the number of analysts formally following the firm; β0 and α0 are intercepts; and εt 
and νt are error terms. The regressions include institution-specific and calendar year-specific variables. The analysis is based on 3.97 
million observations between 1999 and 2005. Statistical significance is indicated by **, * for one and five percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Order duration and Number of Broker first stage regression 
Order Characteristics Duration 
  
Order Characteristics Number of Broker   
Intercept 0.109 **   Intercept  1.031 ** 
Informed Order -0.211 *   Informed Order  -0.061 * 
Complexity of Order 2.656 **   Complexity of Order 6.964 ** 
Liquidity Demander 0.101 **   Liquidity Demander  0.012 ** 
Nasdaq dummy 0.068 **   Nasdaq dummy  0.001 ** 
Market Capitalization -0.937 **   Market Capitalization  -0.147 ** 
Stock Volatility 0.285 **   Stock Volatility  0.020 ** 
           
Fixed Effects Included Yes   Fixed Effects Included  Yes 
           
Adjusted R-Square 0.04%   Adjusted R-Square   0.02% 
 
Panel B: Institutional friction second stage regressions 
Order Characteristics 
Adverse 
Selection or 
Cost Recovery 
Clean-up 
Cost  
Price Impact 
Cost 
Commission 
Cost 
Total 
Execution 
Cost 
Intercept 0.629 ** -0.182 ** -0.597 ** 0.052 ** -0.098 ** 
Complexity of Order 1.482 ** 0.668 ** 0.616 ** -0.034  2.733 ** 
Duration 0.595 ** -0.184 ** -0.586 ** 0.050 ** -0.124 ** 
Number of Broker 4.351 ** 1.646 ** 1.227 ** -0.054 ** 7.171 ** 
Liquidity Demander -0.659 ** 0.375 ** 1.211 ** -0.002 ** 0.925 ** 
Nasdaq dummy -0.046 ** 0.059 ** 0.050 ** 0.013 ** 0.076 ** 
Market Capitalization 1.190 ** -0.185 ** 0.066 * 0.010 ** -1.298 ** 
Stock Volatility -0.198 ** -0.034 ** 0.171 ** 0.065 ** 0.400 ** 
Analyst Coverage 0.004 ** 0.001 * -0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.003 ** 
Index Stock -0.036 ** -0.013 ** -0.034 ** -0.015 ** -0.098 ** 
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.100 ** 0.009 ** 0.005 ** 0.006 ** -0.080 ** 
           
Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Adjusted R-Square 0.50% 0.35% 11.26% 10.74% 0.44% 
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Figure 1. Order Volume, Duration and Number of Brokers  
 
Panel A. Submitted order volume for each category is shown with the blue bars on the left vertical scale. 
Order duration is shown with candlesticks on the right vertical axis. The bottom of the stick shows 25th 
percentile of order duration within the category. The bottom of the candle shows mean order duration. 
The top of the candle shows the 90th percentile and the top of the stick shows the 99th percentile of order 
duration.  
 
Panel B. Number of Brokers 
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Figure 2. Components of Institutional Trading Frictions 
Based on all 3.97 million institutional orders with client-supplied volume for 1999-2005 sample period 
 
 
 Figure 3. Persistence in clean-up costs over time 
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Figure 4. Clean-up cost and cost-recovery distribution 
In each picture, the horizontal axis shows transaction cost ranges in 1% intervals. We consolidate 
the extreme categories by clubbing the orders that have less than -20% or more than 20% cost. 
The vertical axis plots the proportion of all orders with a specific characteristic that fall in that 
transaction cost range. Clean-up cost graphs are on the left and cost recovery on the right. 
Panel A: Firm size categories 
 
 
Panel B: Liquidity supplier versus liqudity demander 
 
 
Panel C: Duration 
  
